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INTRODUCTION
In the 1960's Congress set out to disclose the workings of federal
administrative agencies through the mechanism of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).' However, expansive judicial interpreta-
tions of the FOIA's exemptions produced an Act that fell short of
the legislative intent of "pierc[ing] the paper curtain of bureauc-
racy."' In response, Congress amended the Act, effecting important
substantive changes in the investigatory records exemption. The
changes in that exemption's language may placate those commenta-
tors who had criticized earlier drafts of the legislation. ' Congress
established a weighing of interests in order to abrogate a line of
judicial interpretations that allowed too much withholding. In-
creased disclosure may be a laudable goal, but it remains to be seen
whether a balancing of interests will reconcile the courts and Con-
gress. Specifically, it appears that courts, when confronting FOIA
actions brought against labor administrative agencies, have given
an unduly restrictive interpretation to the congressional intent be-
hind the amended exemption. Such interpretations are based, at
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, 5 U.S.CA. § 552 (Supp. I, 1975).
2. 112 CONG. REC. 13,647 (1966) (remarks of Representative Laird). The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889
(1972), found the legislative purpose of the FOIA was "to enable the public to have sufficient
information in order to be able, through the electoral process, to make intelligent, informed
choices with respect to the nature, scope, and procedure of federal governmental activities."
However, such has not always been the case. One commentator suggested: "exemption 7 has
emerged as the most relied upon exemption to support withholding though other sections
have also been used." Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 150, 158 (1969). [See Appendix]. For other analyses of the (b)(7) exemption
as originally enacted see Kramer & Weinberg, The Freedom of Information Act, 63 GEo. L.J.
49, 65-67 (1974); Koch, The Freedom of Information Act: Suggestions for Making Information
Available to the Public, 32 MD. L. REV. 189, 206-11 (1972); Katz, The Games Bureaucrats
Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 1261, 1277-84
(1970); Moss, Public Information Policies, the APA, and Executive Privilege, 15 AD. L. REv.
111, 113-14 (1963); Note, Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 CoLuM.
L. REV. 895, 943-48 (1974); Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations,
56 GEO. L.J. 18, 47-50 (1967); Note, 80 HAav. L. REV. 909 (1967). See also Note, The Freedom
of Information Act Amendments of 1974: An Analysis, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 951 (1975).
3. One of the earliest critics of the Freedom of Information Act, Kenneth Culp Davis,
claimed, "A crucial observation that some will find regrettable is that apparently no federal
statute of general applicability forbids federal agenices or employees to make disclosures that
would constitute clearly unwarranted invasions of personal privacy." Davis, The Information
Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 766 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Davis].
See also Note, The Freedom of Information Act-The Parameters of the Exemptions, 62 GEO.
L.J. 177 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FOIA-Parameters].
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least in part, upon the particular administrative context in which
such cases have arisen. The result has been the creation of poten-
tially dangerous precedents that could once again circumvent the
broad congressional mandate of disclosure. This article explores the
case law under the earlier investigatory files exemption to the Free-
dom of Information Act, the congressional response to these inter-
pretations, and the resulting language and judicial interpretations
of the new exemption 7 amendment.
THE ORIGINAL INVESTIGATORY FILES EXEMPTION
The Freedom of Information Act of 1967' was the first federal
legislation providing for a broad rule of disclosure.5 The Act com-
pelled federal administrative agencies to disclose identifiable re-
cords to any person upon request, except those records involving
matters within nine stated exemptions.' To implement the disclo-
4. Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 [codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)].
The FOIA was the product of a 12-year effort to correct the deficiences of the former section
3 of the Administrative Procedures Act. See note 5 infra.
5. Prior to 1967, the availability of governmentally held information to the public was
controlled by the "Public Information" section of the Administrative Procedures Act, Act of
June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3(c), 60 Stat. 238 providing:
PUBLIC RECORDS.-Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official
record shall in accordance with published rule be made available to persons pro-
perly and directly concerned except information held confidential for good cause
found.
Despite the first congressional mandate to allow broad disclosure, the Administrative Proce-
dures Act was used as authority to withhold public records. See H.R. REP. No. 1947, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1966) [hereinafter cited as H. REP. 1497]; H.R. REP. No. 918, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1963); 112 CONG. REC. 12,976 (1966) (remarks of Representative Howard). The
Act's major deficiency was that it made records available only to interested persons as op-
posed to the general public. The Act's exemptions for government functions requiring secrecy
and adjudicatory final opinions and orders were too vague to implement effectively any
disclosure policy, and no enforcement mechanism existed.
In 1958, Congress amended the previously nondisclosure-oriented Federal Housekeeping
Act to no longer "authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the availabil-
ity of records to the public." Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547, amending
5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958) (Rev. Stat. § 161). Nonetheless, agency disclosures were few and far
between. See Sperandeo v. Milk Drivers Local 537, 334 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1964); Olson Rug
Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1961); Rosee v. Board of Trade, 35 F.R.D. 512 (N.D. Ill.
1964). The inability of these Acts to provide the desired disclosure necessitated further con-
gressional action.
6. As originally enacted, section 552(b) exempted matters that were:
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the
national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by the law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
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sure scheme of the Act, Congress vested in the federal district courts
jurisdiction to review de novo an agency's denial of a request. In
such proceedings the burden rests on the agency to demonstrate a
specific exemption as a basis for its action.7 Although the original
Act did not provide for a procedure to determine the applicability
of the exemption, some courts took it upon themselves to review the
documents in camera in order to assess their protected status.' For
the most part, however, courts relied upon the affidavits of the
defending agencies to ascertain if disclosure was warranted.
The original Act did not clearly define the scope and application
of the exemptions.' Conflicting with the Act's stated goal-freedom
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent
available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports pre-
pared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or
supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974).
For a discussion of the above exemptions and earlier judicial interpretations see FOIA-
Parameters, supra note 3.
8. Despite the lack of statutory authorization, a number of courts did conclude that in
camera review was warranted when dealing with an investigatory files case. For example, in
Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971),
the court summarily rejected the government's affidavit as conclusive on the exemption issue
and examined the files in order to determine their nature. See Evans v. Department of
Transportation, 446 F.2d 821, 823 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Ash Grove
Cement Co. v. FTC, 371 F. Supp. 370, 374 (D.D.C. 1973); Stern v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp.
1316, 1319 (D.D.C. 1973). Contra, Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 993 (1974).
9. The rationales supporting the invocation of the original exemption were found in the
various congressional debates and not in the language of the exemption itself. Additionally,
the Act's legislative history, although voluminous, sheds no light on the subject and may be
one of the reasons behind the courts' unwarranted assumption of the responsibility to define
the meaning and the application of the exemptions. Hearings and committee meetings were
held over a 10-year period. However, most of the useful legislative history is found in a 10-
page Senate committee report, and a 14-page House report. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 813]; H. REP. 1497, supra note 5. See also S. REP.
No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1160, S. 1336, S. 1758, and
S. 1879, Administrative Procedures Act, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Hearings Before the
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, on H.R. 5012-21, 5237,
5406, 5583, 6172, 6739, 7010, and 7161, Federal Public Records Law, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965); Hearings Before the Subcommittee On Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1663 Administrative Procedure Act, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964); Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Governmental Opera-
tions, Government Information, Plans and Policies, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Procedure and Practice of the Senate Judiciary
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of information-were the equally important rights of privacy with
respect to certain information in government files." Faced with
these opposing interests, Congress debated at length which interests
warranted protection despite the disclosure orientation of the Act.
With regard to investigatory files, Congress made the following de-
terminations: (a) the government must be allowed to avoid the pre-
mature disclosure of information obtained during an investigation
in order to prevent such information from falling into the hands of
potential defendants and to preserve the government's case for the
courtroom;" (b) the government must be allowed to keep confiden-
tial its investigatory procedures and techniques;" and (c) the pri-
vacy of persons involved in investigations must be protected.,3
As originally enacted, the seventh exemption provided for the
protection of "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses except to the extent available by law to a party other than an
agency. " 4 As stated in the Attorney General's Memorandum on the
Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedures Act,'
the exemption preserved a litigant's access to those documents from
investigatory files to which he otherwise would have access.16 The
clause was interpreted to give a party defendant in an action for a
violation of a federal regulatory statute the same discovery rights to
obtain investigatory files as were available to persons charged with
Committee on S. 1966 and S. 1663, Freedom of Information, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963);
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee on S. 921, Freedom of Information and Secrecy in Government, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958).
For discussion and significant action on the floor of each House, see 103 CONG. REC. 7491-
92; 104 CONG. REc. 6547-75; 104 CONG. REc. 15688-99; 110 CONG. REc. 17086-89; 110 CONG.
REC. 17666-68; 111 CONG. REC. 13007. For a discussion of the legislative history of section
552(b)(7), see Davis, supra note 3; Note, The Investigatory Files Exemption to the FOIA: The
D.C. Circuit Abandons Bristol-Myers, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 869, 872-75 (1974); Note, The
Freedom of Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 150, 158-59 (1969).
10. S. REP. 813, supra note 9, at 3.
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id. at 3.
13. 110 CONG. REC. 17667 (1964) (remarks by Senator Humphrey).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. V, 1970) (emphasis added).
15. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC
INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMO].
16. 1967 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMO, supra note 15, at 38; see Benson v. United States,
309 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (D. Neb. 1970)(Act does not give private party indirectly any greater
or earlier access to investigatory files than he would have directly in such litigation or pro-
ceeding); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(exemption 7 merely codifies existing judicially and congressionally created exemptions); H.
REP. 1497, supra note 5, at 11. See Wellman Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 430 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 23 (4th Cir. 1971);
cf. Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974).
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violating federal criminal laws.,7 The few courts that considered the
effect of the clause on a claim of exemption ruled that the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure governed disclosure. The courts rea-
soned that Congress did not intend to give private individuals or
parties charged with violations of federal regulatory statutes greater
access to investigatory files than they would enjoy as defendants in
criminal actions. 8 Other courts interpreted the phrase to be merely
a "savings clause" designed to ensure that the FOIA did not abridge
rights guaranteed by other legislation providing access to informa-
tion during litigation. 9 Although these views remained peacefully
unreconciled by the courts, the divergence did not become signifi-
cant until the courts confronted the newly amended seventh exemp-
tion.20
Despite legislative history and judicial authority to the contrary,2'
it was settled that "law enforcement purposes" involved regulatory
as well as judicial enforcement proceedings.22 What was not settled
17. The defendant would, for example, have the right given to criminal defendants by the
Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), providing that a defendant in a United States criminal
prosecution may examine relevant statements of government witnesses after the witness has
testified on direct examination. See, e.g., Clement Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540, 542
(N.D. Ga. 1968); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 712 (E.D.
Pa. 1968); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591, 593-94 (D.P.R. 1967).
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 is the general discovery rule. Rule 16(a) permits discovery of any
confession or grand jury testimony of a defendant, in addition to reports of medical examina-
tions and scientific tests. Rule 16(b) allows discovery of books, papers and other tangible
materials, but exempts any investigatory file and witness statements except for exculpatory
material, as authorized by the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
19. See, e.g., Anchorage Bldg. Trades Council v. HUD, 384 F. Supp. 1236, 1240-41 (D.
Alaska 1974); B & C Tire Co. v. IRS, 376 F. Supp. 708, 713-14 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Williams v.
IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D. Del. 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973).
20. See text accompanying notes 121 and 151 infra.
21. Whereas the Senate Report discussed the seventh exemption as pertaining to "files
prepared by Government agencies to prosecute law violators," the House Report
interpretated the exemption to cover files related to the enforcement of "all kinds of laws,
labor and securities laws as well as criminal laws." S. REP. 813, supra note 9, at 9; H. REP.
1497, supra note 5, at 11. See also 1967 A-rORNEY GENERAL'S MEMO, supra note 15, at 37.
22. "[Tlhe legislative history of the Act itself makes it clear that the exemption [seven]
is not limited solely to criminal law enforcement but rather applies to law enforcement
activities of all natures." Clement Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540, 542 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
See also Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore, 508 F.2d 945, 949 (4th
Cir. 1974) (FOIA request filed to obtain Department of Labor accident report in shipper's
indemnity action against stevedore); Aspin v. Department of Defense, 348 F. Supp. 1081
(D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(suit to compel Secretary of the Army to
release preliminary investigation report of the My Lai Incident); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,
284 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 424 F.2d 935
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970) (action to seek files compiled by FTC regarding
misleading advertising after withdrawal of complaint two years earlier); Cooney v. Sun Ship-
building & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (motion to compel production of
accident report prepared by investigators representing the Office of Occupational Safety of
the Department of Labor).
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was whether the exemption applied only to investigatory material
gathered for imminent adjudicatory proceedings. In Bristol-Myers
Co. v. FTC,3 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit had occasion to construe the statutory language. The court
held that an agency could invoke the investigatory files exemption
only if, at the time the request for disclosure was made, the prospect
that enforcement proceedings would be initiated was found by the
district court to be sufficiently "concrete." 4 In reaching this deci-
sion, the court considered it important that the FTC had termi-
nated enforcement proceedings prior to the plaintiff's information
request. The court recognized only one purpose of the exemption:
preventing the premature disclosure of the government's case.
The Bristol-Myers rationale was partially adopted by the Fourth
Circuit in Wellford v. Hardin,"s which required disclosure of warning
letters that the Department of Agriculture had sent to meat proces-
sors. The court concluded that since the purpose of the exemption
was "to prevent premature discovery by a defendant in an enforce-
ment proceeding, " 26 such proceedings were not likely to be hindered
If the exemption applies only to files with primarily a law enforcement purpose behind
them, then those not qualifying are readily produceable. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (where professors engaged in a NLRB voting study were granted names and
addresses of employees eligible to vote in certain representation elections over the govern-
ment's claim of the application of the (b)(7) exemption).
23. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). Bristol-Myers sought an
order to compel the FTC to produce documents relevant to a rule-making proceeding based
upon an extensive FTC staff investigation. Bristol-Myers wished to gain access to the infor.
mation forming the basis for the proposed rule. The FTC had originally intended to litigate
directly against Bristol-Myers concerning the subject matter of the rule which was subse-
quently proposed; however, formal proceedings were never held and the complaint was sub-
sequently withdrawn. For a discussion see Note, 51 TEXAs L. REV. 119 (1972); Note, 38 U.
CIN. L. REv. 570 (1969).
24. 424 F.2d at 939-40, citing H. Rep. 1497, supra note 5, at 11. The case was remanded
with orders that the district court determine whether there was a realistic prospect of enforce-
ment proceedings. Such a decision is certainly in line with the congressional intent that the
exemption was designed to prevent "harm [to] the Government's case in court." S. REP. 813,
supra note 9, at 9.
Similarly, if no enforcement proceedings have been instigated formally, a question remains
concerning the investigatory files compiled on any given subject. In Cowles Communications,
Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971), plaintiff filed a FOIA
complaint against the Immigration and Naturalization Service to obtain records on a particu-
lar person. The plaintiff argued that the investigatory files exemption was inapplicable since
no proceedings were pending against the person whose records he sought. Relying on the
statutory language alone, the court found the Act applicable to investigatory files even though
later circumstances did not warrant an enforcement proceeding. Cf. Legal Aid Society of
Alameda County v. Schultz, 349 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (files sought were not exempt
under § 552(b)(7) because there was no evidence that such files would be used in an imminent
enforcement action or proceeding).
25. 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971), noted in 85 HARV. L. REv. 861 (1972).
26. 444 F.2d at 23. See also Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Getman
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by giving the same information to the public, because the alleged
offenders already had access to the material.
Another legislative purpose was noted in Evans v. Department of
Transportation.27 The plaintiff sought letters written to the Federal
Aviation Administration 11 years earlier alleging that he was men-
tally unfit for service as a commercial airlines pilot. The court held
that the investigatory files exemption protected the informant's
identity,28 reasoning that disclosure might decrease voluntary public
cooperation with the agency 2 and that Congress could not have
intended to require disclosure simply because an investigation had
been completed.
Both Bristol-Myers and Evans v. Department of Transportation
played a significant part in the later decision of Frankel v. SEC."0
In Frankel, shareholders of Occidential Petroleum Corporation
sought disclosure of a mass of SEC material collected in the course
of an intensive investigation of that corporation. The SEC investiga-
tion had resulted in a civil lawsuit which ended in a consent de-
cree.3' The Second Circuit, with a divided panel, thought the crucial
issue was whether exemption 7 continues to apply after termina-
tion of enforcement proceedings. It noted two purposes behind
the exemption: (a) the preventing of premature disclosure of the
results of an investigation so that the government can present its
strongest case in court; and (b) keeping confidential the procedures
by which the agency conducted its investigation and by which it
obtained information. Under the latter rationale, the court rejected
the dissent's suggestion of in camera review32 and found the files in
question within the protection of the exemption despite the termi-
v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1971); H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 77
(1972).
27. 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
28. It should be noted that the court relied in part on a statute requiring secrecy for
information affecting the safety of airline passengers, 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970), thereby bring-
ing the material within another specific exemption to the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970),
disallowing disclosure of information protected by another statute.
29. See also Clement Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ga. 1968), approved in
407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1969)(exempting statements made by the plaintiff's employees during
NLRB investigations on grounds that employees would be "less candid" in their disclosures
if they knew their statements and identity would be freely available to their employers);
Barceloneta Shoe Corporation v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967) (similar case
detailing the hampering effect disclosure would have on the NLRB's interviewing process).
30. 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972). The case is discussed in Note,
51 TEXAs L. REv. 119 (1972); Note, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 93 (1972); Note, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J.
219 (1972).
31. 460 F.2d at 814.
32. 460 F.2d at 818, 820 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
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nation of the investigation by consent decree.33 The disclosable files,
which were accessible under Bristol-Myers upon the termination of
proceedings, were now permanently sealed under a rationale that
would continue for the life of the agency. The decision in Frankel
left FOIA litigants with a substantial impasse; the termination of
proceedings or investigation did not lift the exemption of the mate-
rial if its revelation would expose that agency's investigative tech-
niques or bare the government's strategy. Although a reasonable
conclusion, its effect was to abrogate the disclosure orientation of
the Act by extending protection infinitely.
If termination of proceedings would not justify disclosure, it is
difficult to see how initiation of enforcement proceedings would
require a different outcome. In Welman Industries, Inc. v. NLRB,34
an employer sought access to NLRB investigatory affidavits and
witness statements that had resulted in the Board's setting aside a
representative election held at the plaintiff's plant. During the
course of internal administrative appeal, the plaintiff filed a FOIA
complaint to obtain the documents. In denying the requests, the
court cited premature disclosure of the Board's case and fear of
cutting off confidential sources as the reasons for their decision,
relying on the Act's legislative history.35 The court alluded to a line
of labor cases detailing the unique nature of the employer-employee
relationship in terms of unfair labor practice proceedings and con-
cluded that if an employee knew his statements would be revealed
to his employer, he would be less likely, for fear of reprisal, to make
an uninhibited and nonevasive statement.36 To support its conclu-
sion that exemption of investigatory files was necessary in order to
prevent premature disclosure of the Board's case, the court found
an analogous concern with confidential sources voiced in Frankel
and Evans v. Department of Transportation. The court, in effect,
took the existence of labor enforcement proceedings as the indicator
33. The court relied upon the Fifth Circuit's finding of a continuing exemption beyond
the life of the investigation or proceeding, citing Evans v. Department of Transportation, 446
F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972), despite the fact that the Evans
court relied on the viability of informers' information rationale to justify its conclusion. 446
F.2d at 824. A similar rationale has been applied to discovery attempts in non-FOIA cases.
See, e.g., Intertype Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 41 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969);
NLRB v. National Survey Service, Inc., 361 F.2d 199, 206 (7th Cir. 1966).
34. 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974).
35. Unlike most courts, the bench looked to the House Report to find that "S. 1160 is not
intended to give a party indirectly any earlier or greater access to investigatory files than he
would have directly in such litigation or proceedings." H. REP. 1497, supra note 5, at 11.
36. Id. at 12, citing Intertype Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1049 (1969); NLRB v. National Survey Service, Inc., 361 F.2d 199, 206 (7th Cir. 1966);
Intertype Co. v. Penello, 269 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Va. 1967).
[Vol. 8
Amended FOIA
that disclosure of materials related to that proceeding would be
unwarranted.
The divergence between congressional intent and judicial inter-
pretation became apparent in a 1973 decision, Weisberg v. Depart-
ment of Justice.37 Plaintiff Weisberg, author of several books on the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy, sought access to a spec-
trographic analysis of the bullet that killed the president. Though
the government had completed its investigation and though the files
involved neither informants' identities nor secret investigatory tech-
niques, the court nevertheless asserted that the materials were "in-
vestigatory files compiled by the FBI for law enforcement purposes,
and, as such, [we]re exempt from the disclosure sought to be com-
pelled." 8 The court did not discuss whether any of the previously
cited purposes of the exemption would be defeated by disclosure and
made it clear that it was unnecessary to do so. Citing the Supreme
Court's ruling in EPA v. Mink," the court suggested that there was
no room for balancing opposing interests when the government re-
lied upon the investigatory files exemption and could show that the
files had in fact been compiled for law enforcement purposes. Such
decisions quickly limited the issue in (b)(7) exemption litigation to
a finding of whether the materials sought were investigatory and
compiled for a law enforcement purpose, regardless of what the file
contained and whether proceedings were ongoing.
Three other decisions, Aspin v. Department of Defense,40 Ditlow
v. Brinegar,4' and Center for National Policy Review on Race and
37. 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). See Note,
The Investigatory Files Exemption to the FOIA: The D.C. Circuit Abandons Bristol-Myers,
supra note 9, at 871.
38. 489 F.2d at 1197. The opinion written by Judge Danaher replaced that of Judge
Kaufman (sitting by designation) who wrote for the majoricy of the panel which originally
heard the case. The unreported opinion was withdrawn when the case was ordered to be
reheard en banc. Judge Bazelon, sitting on the panel in both the original argument and the
second en banc proceeding concurred in Judge Kaufman's original opinion and cited it
liberally in his own dissenting opinion in the reported text of the case. Id. at 1203-07.
39. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). One of the early FOIA cases to reach the Supreme Court, the case
arose over the attempt of 33 Congressmen to obtain documents pertaining to the underwater
nuclear testing scheduled to take place off Amchitka Island in 1971. The files on the subject
were classified by executive order and fell within the national defense and foreign policy
exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
The Supreme Court held that district court judges may not compel disclosure of documents
withheld under the exemption and may not order in camera inspection to delineate non-secret
parts. The decision, like others which Congress eventually overruled, was followed by pro-
posed legislation to amend the FOIA. See H.R. 4960 which was introduced on February 28,
1973 shortly after the Supreme Court rendered the Mink decision. H.R. 4960, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973). See also H.R. 5425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) introduced on March 8, 1973.
40. 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
41. 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974).
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Urban Issues v. Weinberger2 quickly followed, further expanding
the seventh exemption. Aspin involved a Congressman's attempts
to obtain release of the Peers Commission Report, otherwise known
as the "Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investi-
gations into the My Lai Incident.' 3 The purpose of the investiga-
tion was to discover possible suppression or withholding of informa-
tion in the original Army investigations "with a view towards prose-
cution if warranted."" Relying on Frankel, the court noted that 15
officers had already been court-martialed on the basis of the Peers
Commission Report, thereby establishing the report as prepared for
"law enforcement purposes." The court went on to reject plaintiff's
argument that the termination of court-martial proceedings re-
moved the report's protected status, following the analysis of courts
that had feared disclosing investigative techniques and inhibiting
voluntary informants. Having concluded that the exemption's pro-
tection extended beyond the useful life of the investigation, the
court gave the entire report a blanket protection from disclosure.
Ditlow v. Brinegar, the second in the trilogy of "last straw" cases,
involved an attempt to gain access to correspondence between the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and auto manu-
facturers in connection with pending safety defect investigations. In
a summary opinion, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia reasoned:
[I]f the documents in issue are clearly to be classified as "investi-
gatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes," the exemp-
tion attaches, and it is not in the province of the courts to second-
guess the Congress by relying upon considerations which argue
that the Government will not actually be injured by revelation in
the particular case.45
By the time the Center for National Policy case appeared before
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, that court had
narrowed its scope of inquiry in FOIA litigation to the question of
whether the material was an investigatory file compiled for law
enforcement purposes, holding that if the answer was "in the affirm-
ative, [the court's] role is at an end." In arriving at such a re-
42. 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
43. Although the four-volume report was given to the House Armed Service Committee,
of which plaintiff was a member, this action under the FOIA was commenced in the plaintiff's
capacity as a private citizen seeking public release of the entire Peers Committee Report. 491
F.2d at 26 n.14.
44. Id. at 25.
45. 494 F.2d at 1074.
46. 502 F.2d at 372. Davis had earlier predicted such a result:
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stricted issue, the court invoked the line of cases from Weisberg
through Aspin and Ditlow, and declared HEW's Title VI Civil
Rights Compliance Records concerning segregation and discrimina-
tion practices in northern public schools exempt because of the
possibility of a future fund cut-off proceeding. Such literal readings
of the investigatory files exemption ignored both the reasons behind
the exemption and the interests in favor of disclosure. The courts
had fashioned a mechanical test from the literal language of the
statute and thereby reduced the relevant scope of inquiry to a find-
ing that materials sought were either within or beyond the ambit of
the exemption. 7 Considering the awkward draftsmanship"8 and con-
flicting legislative reports,49 there may not have been any logical
Courts that usually constitute themselves working partners with legislative bodies
to produce sensible and desirable legislation may follow their accustomed habits
in narrowing the ascertainable meaning of the words of an exemption, but in some
degree they are restricted in following those habits in broadening that meaning.
Davis, supra note 3, at 783-84.
47. As one commentator has noted, "By following a mechanical approach to the exemp-
tion, courts are freed from the difficult task of weighing competing interests and performing
in camera inspections." Comment, Amendment of the Seventh Exemption Under the Free-
dom of Information Act, 16 WM. & MARy L. REV. 697, 709 n.59 (1975), referring to Center for
National Policy Review of Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger and Weisberg v. Department
of Justice.
48. Davis, supra note 3, at 761, 763; Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The
Amended Freedom of Information Act, 84 YALE L.J. 741, 745 (1975); Project, Government
Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 971, 1023 (1975); FOIA-Para-
meters, supra note 3.
49. Davis, supra note 3, at 763, 809:
In general, the Senate committee is relatively faithful to the words of the Act, and
the House committee ambitiously undertakes to change the meaning that appears
in the Act's words. The main thrust of the House committee remarks that seem to
pull away from the literal statutory words is almost always in the direction of
nondisclosure.
[After the bill had passed the Senate] . . . the House committee was subjected
to pressures to restrict the disclosure requirements. It yielded to the pressure. But
it did not change the bill. Instead, it wrote the restrictions into the committee
report. These restrictions differ drastically from the bill as passed by the Senate;
they often contradict the words of the bill, and they sometimes contradict both the
statutory words and the Senate committee report.
The House Report was published after the Senate had passed its version of the bill, leaving
only the Senate Report to be considered by both houses of Congress. For this reason it may
prove to be a better indication of congressional intent. In construing the Act, courts have
noted this distinction and given deference to the Senate Report. See, e.g., Tax Analysts &
Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (D.D.C. 1973), modified in part, 505 F. 2d 350 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (rejecting the defendant's reliance on the House Report to draw a distinction
between "precedents" and "interpretations"); Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973)
(using the Senate Report in interpretating the (b)(2) exemption); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d
787, 794 (6th Cir. 1972) (relying on the Senate Report in regard to administrative staff
manuals and instructions); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (relying
on the difference in the two reports to grant relief on equitable grounds apart from the
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alternative. A judicially-created "balancing of interests" test in
FOLA litigation" was probably beyond the proper discretion of the
courts since Congress had failed to make provision for such a bal-
ancing though the legislative history demonstrates that it recog-
nized the need.5" Regardless, the result was a virtual nullification of
the statute's disclosure orientation under the seventh exemption.
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL RESTRICTIONS
Ditlow, Aspin, and Center for National Policy overcame congres-
sional inertia and forced a reconsideration of certain parts of the
FOIA. Within a year, a number of proposals to amend the FOIA
were introduced in Congress.5 2 During the course of debate on H.R.
exemptions in the Act itself); Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admin-
istration, 301 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing the Senate Report to find rules of
practice and staff manuals were not related to personnel matters exempt under the second
exemption); Benson v. General Services Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968)
(deferring to the Senate Report in construing the second exemption).
50. Some courts found that the legislative balance had already been struck by the Congress
leaving no room for such balancing on the part of the judiciary.
After considering voluminous testimony on both sides and balancing the public,
private, and administrative interests, Congress decided that the best course was
open access to the governmental process with a very few exceptions. It is not the
province of the courts to restrict that legislative judgment under the guise of judi-
cially balancing the same interests that Congress has considered.
Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24-25 (4th Cir. 1971). See also Robles v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973).
51. The Senate report recognized the problem of balancing the interest in nondisclosure
with the equally valid public interest in disclosure to accord with the purposes of the Act,
but failed to find a proper solution:
It is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is not an impossible
one either. It is not necessary to conclude that to protect one of the interests, the
other must, of necessity, either be abrogated or substantially subordinated Success
lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all
interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure.
S. REP. 813, supra note 9, at 3.
At one point courts made an effort to achieve what the Congress had failed to accomplish.
In Pilar v. SS Hess Petrol, 55 F.R.D. 159, 163 (D. Md. 1972), the court used a balancing
process, stating:
Having determined that the reports and files are within the investigatory file
exemption of the Act, our inquiry must shift now to determine whether these
particular files should be accorded immunity from disclosure and, if so, to what
extent. . ..
• ..In determining the applicability of this privilege to the case at bar, this court
must weigh the competing interests asserted and attempt to reconcile the conflict-
ing policies involved.
In assessing such interests, the court talked in terms of the "speculative interest" that disclo-
sure of informants would inhibit future information flows, and the "immediate interest" that
no active litigation would be jeopardized by immediate disclosure. Id. at 164-65. However,
such judicial attempts at formulating a workable test were seldom undertaken.
52. Amendments had been introduced as early as 1973 following the Supreme Court's
decision in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). For a discussion see note 39 supra. As a result
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12471, Senator Philip Hart introduced an amendment dealing with
the substance of the (b)(7) exemption.53 Congressional dissatisfac-
tion with the judicial interpretation of the original seventh exemp-
tion was the primary reason for seeking a change. ' Committee re-
ports emphasized that the mechanical test applied by the courts in
administering the exemption had negated congressional intent:
Congress did not intend the exemptions in the FOIA to be used to
prohibit disclosure of information or to justify automatic withhold-
ing of information. Rather they are only permissive. They merely
mark the outer limits of the information that may be withheld
55
of the hearings conducted on these bills, H.R. 12471, the actual amendment vehicle, was
introduced early in 1974. Since committee hearings had already been concluded on the earlier
House bills, H.R. 12471 was immediately referred to the House Committee on Government
Operations for full consideration. The bill was reported favorably on March 5, 1974, H.R. REP.
No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), and passed the House of Representatives on March 14,
120 CONG. REc. H 1802-03 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1974). The Senate held hearings on public
information in June 1973: Hearings on Freedom of Information, Executive Privilege, Secrecy
in Government: S. 1142 et al. Before Three Joint Subcommittees of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary and the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
The resulting bill, which was more stringent than that passed in the House, was reported
favorably out of the Judiciary Committee. S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), and
passed on May 30, 1974, 120 CONG. REC. S 9343 (daily ed. May 30, 1974).
53. Senator Hart's amendment was patterned closely after a proposal by the Administra-
tive Law Section of the American Bar Association. Compare 120 CONG. REC. S 9329 (daily
ed. May 30, 1974) with Hearings on H.R. 5425 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 317 (1973). An alternative proposal by the Justice Department was rejected as overly
broad. The proposal would have exempted "investigatory records compiled for any specific
law enforcement purpose the disclosure of which [was] not in the public interest .. " In
addition it would have prohibited absolutely nondisclosure of the following: "(i) scientific
tests, reports, or data, (ii) inspection reports of any agency which relates to health, safety,
environmental protection, or (iii) records which serve as a basis for any public policy state-
ment made by an agency or officer or employee of the United States or which serve as a basis
for rulemaking by any agency . 5. " S 1142, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(d) (1973); H.R. 5425,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(d) (1973). See Hearings on S. 1142 Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., vol. 2, at 227 (1973). See also 120 CONG. REc. S 9336 (daily ed. May 30, 1974)(excerpt
from Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation of The Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, April 22, 1974).
54. MR. KENNEDY. . . . Does the Senator's amendment in effect override the
court decisions in the court of appeals on the Weisberg against United States; Aspin
against Department of Defense; Ditlow against Brinegar; and National Center
against Weinberger [cases]? As I understand it, the holdings in those particular
cases are of the greatest concern to the Senator from Michigan. As I interpret it,
the impact and effect of his amendment would be to override those particular
decisions. Is that not correct?
MR. HART. The Senator from Michigan [sic] is correct. That is its purpose. That
was the purpose of the Congress in 1966, we thought, when we enacted this.
120 CONG. REC. S 9336 (daily ed. May 30, 1974). See also H.R. REP. No. 1380 (Conference
Report), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974).
55. S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974). See, e.g., Charles River Park "A," Inc.
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In addition to expressing the intent to override case law expanding
the substantive parameters of the exception, the Senate Report
specifically adverted to the limited use of in camera inspection.5"
The Report rejected blind reliance on agency affidavits and estab-
lished in camera inspection of questioned documents as the means
to determine conclusively their protected status. These admonitions
presaged the revision of the investigatory files exemption itself. If
the conditions necessary to invoke the seventh exemption could be
satisfied merely by showing that the file was investigative, that its
compilation was for law enforcement, and that an enforcement pro-
ceeding was pending, there would be no need for a court to conduct
an in camera inspection. The material in the file would be exempt
as a matter of law. Thus, the inclusion of the in camera inspection
provision in the amended Act complements the subsequent amend-
ment to exemption 7.
Senator Hart believed that the courts had erred in not balancing
the relevant interests." However, instead of requiring or permitting
the courts to engage in a process of ad hoc balancing, the amend-
ment itself sought to balance the relevant interests. As finally en-
acted by Congress, the amended investigatory records exemption
implements this balancing by enumerating six interests protected
from disclosure under the Act. The amendment explicitly places
v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
56. It should be noted that on at least two occasions, however the government
has taken the position that the seventh exemption (subsection (b)(7)) relating to
disclosure of investigatory files also represents a blanket exemption where in cam-
era inspection is unwarranted and inappropriate under the statute. (Stern v. Ri-
chardson. . . Weisberg v, Department of Justice .. . ) By expressly providing for
in camera inspection regardless of the exemption invoked by the government S.
2543 would make clear the congressional intent-implied but not expressed in the
original FOIA-as to the availability of an in camera examination in all FOIA cases.
This examination would apply not just to the labeling but to the substance of the
records involved.
S. REP. No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974).
57. 120 CONG. REc. S 9331 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Hart).
58. The newly amended exemption reads:
[I]nvestigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement
proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudica-
tion, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the
identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal
law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency
conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential infor-
mation furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative tech-
niques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforce-
ment personnel.
5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. I, 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970). Other amend-
ments, although not directly relevant here, significantly affect the overall workability of the
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the burden of justifying non-disclosure on the government, which
now has to show that disclosure would interfere with enforcement
proceedings, deprive a person of a right to a fair trial, constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, reveal the identity of
informants, disclose investigative techniques, or endanger the life or
safety of enforcement personnel. Thus, the amendment has added
a necessary additional step to any judicial determination on a FOIA
action. Having determined that the materials are within the pur-
view of the statute as investigatory records, 9 the court must still
order disclosure unless it would harm one or more of the protected
interests.
Under the first subsection of the amended Act, records may be
withheld if disclosure would "interfere with enforcement proceed-
ings." If there is a concrete prospect of an enforcement proceeding,"0
documents or portions of documents may be withheld if disclosure
would impede the investigation or would harm the government's
case.6" Even with enforcement proceedings in progress, in camera
inspection is necessary to determine if disclosure would interfere
with such proceedings.
Records may be withheld if disclosure would "deprive a person of
a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication."62 The exemption
is designed to protect individuals against prejudicial publicity in
criminal trials.63
Act. The amendments require agency indexes identifying information, lessen the requirement
of "identifiable records" to records reasonably described, attempt to remove fees as an obsta-
cle to disclosure, specifically authorize in camera inspections of records, allow attorneys' fees
to be awarded to complainants in suits brought to compel disclosure, create relatively short
deadlines for agency action in response to requests for production of documents, expedite
appeals of district court actions as well as cases at the district court level, substantially
change the first exemption to require information exempted by executive order to be related
to national defense or foreign policy, provide for division of reasonably segregable records, and
require annual reports to Congress of the requests for information received by each agency. 5
U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. 1, 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). See S. REP. No. 93-1200,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
59. The amendment changed the previously worded "files" to "records," and so pacified
at least one of the earlier statute's critics, Kenneth Culp Davis, who contended that "files"
was an unsatisfactory term since it implied if part of the material in any given file was
investigatory, the entire file was exempt. Davis, supra note 3, at 800, 807. The change avoids
the problem of rendering otherwise disclosable materials exempt merely by placing it in an
investigatory file. 120 CONG. REc. S 9332 (daily ed. May 30, 1974)(remarks of Senator Ken-
nedy).
60. The legislative history indicates that "enforcement proceedings" refers only to a "con-
crete prospective law enforcement proceeding." H. REP. 1497, supra note 5, at 11.
61. 120 CONG. REC. S 9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Hart). In this
respect the amended Act adopts the "concreteness" test of the Bristol-Myers court.
62. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(B) (Supp. I, 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
63. Ellsworth, Amended Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, 25 AM. U.L.
REV. 37, 46 (1975). The exemption appears to adopt the reasoning advanced in the pre-
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Records may be withheld if disclosure would "constitute an un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy."64 The exemption's protec-
tion extends to all individuals mentioned in files, as well as the
person who is the subject of the investigation.'5 Potential invasions
of privacy can best be avoided by deleting names and other identify-
ing details of persons referred to in files.66 Similarly, no invasion of
privacy would result from granting access to a file on the person
making such a request. 7
The (b)(7)(D) exemption relating to the identity and information
of confidential sources6 8 has two parts. In civil cases, this clause
protects the names and other identifying details that might reasona-
bly be found to lead to disclosure of a source who has received an
expressed or implied assurance of confidentiality. 9 The subsection
D exemption was primarily aimed at protecting informants in crimi-
nal investigations." It confers "blanket protection" not only for the
amendment case, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
In that case, HUD claimed that the disclosure of the names of certain appraisers who had
allegedly appraised homes far in excess of their actual value, would subject the potential
defendants to the risk of such publicity. The court held that under the facts of the case, such
a claim was too speculative, but did not rule out the possibility that the exemption was
designed to serve that purpose.
64. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(C) (Supp. I, 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970). This
provision suggests a balancing of the public interest in favor of disclosure against the invasion
of privacy which might result from disclosure. See 120 CONG. REc. S 9330 (daily ed. May 30,
1974)(remarks of Senator Hart). Courts have generally interpreted such provision as relating
to those items which are commonly thought of as private. See, e.g., Mylan Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (W.D. Pa. 1975), citing Rural Housing Alliance v.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (information concerning marital
status, legitimacy of children, identity of fathers of children, medical conditions, welfare
payments, alcoholic consumption, family fights); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133
(3d Cir. 1974)(home address, family status); Ackerley v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(medical files); Ditlow v. Schultz, 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974)(travel history).
65. 120 CoNG. REc. S 9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Hart).
66. The amended Act's provisions for such deletions and for the disclosure of segregable
records or portions thereof from those which are exempt is a significant step towards facilitat-
ing disclosure. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (Supp. 1, 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1970).
67. H.R. REP. No. 1380 (Conference Report), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
68. A committee change from "informer" to "confidential source" makes it clear that
protection extends to paid informers and disinterested citizens only when information is given
under an express assurance of confidentiality or that circumstances would reasonably so
imply. S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974).
69. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974)(Conference Report). Courts have
generally been wary in applying such language, so that the mere assertion of a promise of
confidentiality will not exempt records from disclosure. See, e.g., Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d
887, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir. 1973); Getman v. NLRB,
450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971). See also H.R. REP. No. 92-1419,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1972), citing as one of the "most flagrant abuses" of the FOIA the
Price Commission's solicitation of confidentiality from companies which apply for price in-
creases, stating, "[Tihe Committee knows of no agency that has specific authority to extend
blanket exemption, let alone to solicit the exemption of confidentiality."
70. H.R. REP. No. 93-1308, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974).
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identity of the confidential source, but for the information he alone
provided.7 However, if information is furnished by more than one
source, though the information must be disclosed, the names and
identifying details of the confidential source may still be withheld.
It appears that Congress decided not to extend the added protection
for confidential sources to civil law enforcement agencies or to civil
investigations, but there is no explanation for this decision in the
legislative history. Since civil law enforcement investigations can
lead to criminal prosecutions, similar protections may be warranted
for confidential files in such instances. Second, the need for the
complete protection of confidential sources may be as important in
civil investigations as in criminal investigations because a confiden-
tial source may be equally critical to the success of each.
Under subsection E, records may also be withheld if production
would "disclose investigative techniques and procedures." The 1975
amendment rejects the Bristol-Myers rule that the exemption can-
not apply if no enforcement proceeding is pending, since dated re-
cords could still disclose useful investigative practices. Likewise, the
amendment rejects the approach of the Frankel court, which would
have extended the exemption to include even those investigative
techniques generally known to the public. The legislative history
limits the application of the exemption to secret techniques and
procedures, rather than routine scientific tests such as fingerprint-
ing or ballistics, 2 questioning of witnesses, 3 or preparation of affida-
vits.
The exemption for records the disclosure of which would "endan-
ger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel" pres-
ents no interpretive difficulties.7
Certain conclusions emerge from this review of the case law and
the congressional intent. First, Congress sought to exclude as a basis
for exemption generalized assertions that confidential sources or
investigative procedures would be compromised.7" Second, it
71. "[I1t relieves [the agency] of the burden of showing that disclosure would actually
reveal the identity of a confidential source." 120 CONG. REC. S 19812 (Nov. 21, 1974) (remarks
of Senator Hart). However, Senator Kennedy was quick to add, "such information . . .
compiled in civil litigation" would be available. Id. at S 1981.
72. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974)(Conference Report); 120 CONG. REC.
S 9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974)(remarks of Senator Hart),
73. 120 CONG. REc. S 9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Hart).
74. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL MEMO ON 1974 AMENDMENTS
TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACr 12 (1974).
75. 120 CONG. REc. S 9332 (Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation of The Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York). But cf. Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 817 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972). Congress did retain an exception in amended exemp-
tion 7(E) for specialized investigative techniques; such exemption does not however refer to
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changed the focus of inquiry from a broad view of "investigatory
files" to a narrower concern with particular "investigatory re-
cords."76 Third, it emphasized that the "Government . . . would
have to show that disclosure would"" result in a specified statutory
harm. This makes the burden of proof provisions of amended section
552(a)(4)(B) applicable to exemption 7. Fourth, Congress elimi-
nated from the statute the "savings" clause of the original exemp-
tion-"except to the extent available by law to a party other than
an agency"-which the government had construed as fixing the
maximum disclosure it need allow.18
The amended FOIA garnered the requisite two-thirds margin to
overcome a presidential veto" and became effective February 19,
1975.
LITIGATION UNDER THE AMENDED INVESTIGATORY RECORDS ExEMPTION
The amended Act appears to have been successful in nullifying
specific case law. The Peers Commission Report sought in Aspin v.
Department of Defense s8 the spectrographic analysis of the assas-
sin's bullet requested in Weisberg v. Department of Justice,"1 and
routine techniques or procedures which are generally known outside the Government. S. REP.
No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 12 (1974).
76. Compare, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1967), with 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(A)-(E) (Supp. I,
1974).
77. 120 CONG. REc. S 9330 (daily ed., May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Hart).
78. See Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 993 (1974), where the court suggests that a FOIA plaintiff must in fact be engaged
in the litigation with the Government in order to qualify as a "party" and to invoke the Act.
Id. at 1203 n.15.
79. President Ford returned H.R. 12471 without approval on October 17, 1974, citing the
stringent showing of harmful effect that an agency must make to justify nondisclosure. Ford
offered a substitute proposal which would have allowed nondisclosure upon demonstration
of a "substantial possibility" that disclosure would affect an enumerated interest. Letter from
President Ford to Representative Carl Albert, Oct. 25, 1974. The President expressed disap-
proval of the limited protection of confidential sources which the amendment provided,
noting that several agencies perform civii law enforcement functions that often lead to crimi-
nal prosecutions, thereby impairing the confidentiality of information to be eventually used
in such proceedings. Finally, the President voiced criticism of any provision that would
require law enforcement agencies to devote efforts to a paragraph-by-paragraph screening of
their files. MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES VETOING H.R. 12471, H.R. Doc.
No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Nov. 18, 1974). Congress overrode the President's veto by a
substantial margin in the House of Representatives (371 to 31), 120 CONG. REC. H 10,875
(daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974) and a more narrow margin in the Senate (65 to 27), 120 CONG. REC.
S 19,823 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974).
80. See text accompanying note 43 supra. Subsequent to passage of the amendments, the
report was released to the Daily Oklahoman, a newspaper that had initiated a new FOIA
request for the report. Some names were deleted to protect privacy interests.
81. See text accompanying note 37 supra. After negotiations failed, Mr. Weisberg again
filed suit on the day the amendments took effect, seeking access to the spectrographic analysis
and also seeking reports on several other scientific tests conducted for the Warren Commis-
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the safety defect correspondence desired in Ditlow v. Brinegar,2
were all disclosed as a result of proceedings reinstituted by con-
cerned parties after the effective date of the amended Act. 3
Other problems unresolved under the original Act have received
specific judicial treatment. Frankel v. SEC had placed a substantial
roadblock in the path of FOIA litigants by extending an exemption
beyond the life of an investigation or proceeding. The court in
Kaminer v. NLRB 4 was asked to reconsider such a problem within
the context of the amended Act. Upon the receipt of an unfair labor
practice charge by a union official, the NLRB conducted its usual
investigation, interviewing witnesses and taking affidavits. Before
the Board acted on the investigation, however, the union requested
and received permission to withdraw the charges. Upon receipt of
such permission the union filed its own civil suit against the
employer. The employer brought a FOIA action against the NLRB
to obtain the affidavits that the Board's agents took in the course
of their investigation. The court rejected the government's claim
that subsection 7(A) was applicable, citing legislative debate to the
effect that the claimed exemption:
should apply only when "the Government's case in court . . .
would be harmed by the premature release of evidence . . ." or
where disclosure would "harm such proceedings by impeding any
necessary investigation before the proceeding."85
sion. The Government had disclosed several such reports to him, but it alleged that others
either never existed or could not be located. Weisberg originally challenged the good faith of
the FBI's representations but agreed to drop the suit on July 15, 1975, after having gained
access to the spectrographic analysis. Weisberg v. Department of Justice, Civ. No. 75-226
(D.D.C., filed Feb. 19, 1975), dismissed as moot per stipulation, July 15, 1975. Prior to
dismissal, Weisberg had sought to use interrogatories to pin down questions that remained
unanswered by the affidavits filed by the Government. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia ordered a new trial after it found that the district court erred in refusing to order
the Government to answer Weisberg's interrogatories. Weisberg v. Department of Justice,
Civ. No. 75-2021 (D.C. Cir., July 7, 1976).
82. See text accompanying note 45 supra. Since the passage of the amendments, the
NHTSA has adopted a policy of making these files available to the public while the investiga-
tion is being conducted.
83. This left the Center for National Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v.
Weinberger as the only case specifically remaining after passage of the amended Act. The
Center, rather than making a new FOIA request to the agency, sought to have the court
reopen the original case. The court declined to do so on the ground that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. Center for National Policy Review of Race and Urban Issues v. Richard-
son, Civ. No. 2177-71 (D.D.C., Feb. 24, 1975). On appeal, the court of appeals held that the
original "case or controversy" had ended, and following the amendment of the Act, plaintiffs
had to begin at the beginning, with an initial request to the agency involved. Center for
National Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 351, 353 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
84. 90 L.R.R.M. 2269 (S.D. Miss. 1975).
85. 120 CONG. REC. 9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974)(remarks of Senator Hart).
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Since the Board's file in the case had already been closed, as in
Bristol-Myers, the court reasoned that there was simply no possibil-
ity of future enforcement proceedings, finding that the "interference
with enforcement proceedings" rationale of the exemption could not
survive termination of the proceedings themselves.8"
Mobil Oil Corporation v. FTC87 laid to rest the preamendment
cases holding that the pendancy of law enforcement proceedings in
and of itself established the applicability of exemption 7. The
Mobil Oil court rejected the FTC's argument that an "implicit ex-
emption" authorized the withholding of contested information." In
this respect the amended seventh exemption appears to have ac-
complished its goal of completely reversing the thrust of the exemp-
tion so as to allow withholding only when a protected interest is
shown to be invaded. 89
Although initially endorsed by the Supreme Court,'" the renewed
86. 90 L.R.R.M. at 2271. The court did find that the "confidential source" rationale of
the 7(D) exemption was applicable because of an implied promise of confidentiality by the
very nature of the Board's investigatory function. The court ordered an in camera inspection
to delete material identifying the confidential sources, thereby protecting such sources from
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy within the terms of the 7(C) exemption.
87. 406 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Plaintiff corporation sought access to FTC commu-
nications relating to petroleum use from early 1970 to mid-1973. The documents fell into three
categories: (a) those between the FTC and Congress, (b) those between the Commission and
various federal agencies, and (c) those between the Commission and state government agen-
cies. The FTC partially granted the request but continued to refuse disclosure of certain
portions of state agency documents which contained identifying names and details of persons
who communicated with government officials. In discussing the FTC's "black-out" of all
identifying information or Commission correspondence, the FTC argued an "implicit exemp-
tion" inherent in the Act. The Commission claimed the deletions were part of a file compiled
and utilized by the FTC for an ongoing investigation into activities of the petroleum industry
for possible violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act and that identifying details in
the documents are accordingly protected from disclosure.
88. 406 F. Supp. at 313. The court concluded that the absence of supportive affidavits
clearly demonstrated that the government could not sustain its burden of showing disclosure
would interfere with enforcement proceedings.
89. As to communications between the FTC and other federal agencies, the court deferred
ruling on the claimed (b)(7)(A) exemption in order to allow the Commission to index the
documents and to file affidavits in conference, noting that the FTC could conceivably demon-
strate that disclosure of such information could, in and of itself, interfere with enforcement
proceedings.
90. Although dealing only indirectly with the newly amended exemption; the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975), reaffirmed the congressional
intent regarding the exemption by refusing to consider the NLRB's contention that docu-
ments falling into the category of investigatory records need not be individually scrutinized
to see if they contravene the Act. The Court noted in dictum that the purpose of the amend-
ment was to:
limit application of Exemption 7 to agency records so that it would apply only to
the extent that "the production of such records would interfere with enforcement
proceedings, deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication,
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disclosure orientation of the amended exemption has had a troubled
infancy. By far the greatest number of postamendment cases have
involved an agency that has traditionally led a secluded existence
in relation to information requests of any form, the National Labor
Relations Board.' Litigation under the amended Act involving the
NLRB is one response to the Board's restrictive prehearing discov-
ery procedures.
The National Labor Relations Act does not specifically require
the NLRB to adopt discovery procedures," leaving the matter to the
Board's rule-making power . 3 The Board rule pertaining to an en-
forcement proceeding, unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
does not provide for the taking of depositions for the purpose of
discovery. Instead, it permits limited discovery only to obtain and
preserve evidence for trial." Despite numerous arguments to the
constitute [an . ..unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, disclose the ident-
ity of an informer, or disclose investigative techniques and procedures."
Id. at 164-65, quoting S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974). The procedural posture
of the case warranted the Court's summary treatment of the issue before remanding on other
grounds. 421 U.S. at 165.
91. Traditionally, Board regulations have substantially limited investigation and discov-
ery by a party involved in proceedings with the NLRB. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1975),
providing for limited discovery only for the purpose of obtaining and preserving evidence for
trial as opposed to the taking of depositions for the purpose of discovery, as in the case of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Board's rules, affidavits are only available to
litigant "after a witness called by the general counsel or by the charging party has testified
in a hearing upon a complaint . .." The rules provide that "the administrative law judge
shall, upon motion of the respondent, order the production of any statement . . . of such
witness in the possession of the general counsel which relates to the subject matter as to which
the witness has testified [for] examination and use for the purpose of cross-examination."
29 C.FR. § 102.118(b)(1) (1975). The Board's Rules and Regulations thus, in effect, incorpo-
rate the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). See text accompanying note 21 supra.
92. Accord, NLRB v. Lizdale Knitting Mills, Inc., 523 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1975). But see
NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 403 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Safway Steel
Scaffolds Co. of Georgia, 383 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968).
93. See NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 858 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971); Electromec Design and Development Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d
631, 635 (9th Cir. 1969); North American Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 871-72 (10th
Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
823 (1961).
94. 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1975).
95. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 858 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 915 (1971). Section 102.30 of the National Labor Relations Board, Rules and Regula-
tions, Series 8, as amended, provides in pertinent part:
Examination of witnesses; depositions
Witnesses shall be examined orally under oath, except that for good cause shown
after the issuance of a complaint, testimony may be taken by deposition.
(a) Applications to take depositions . . . shall be made to the regional director
prior to the hearing, and to the administrative law judge during and subsequent to
the hearing but before transfer of the case to the Board. . . .The regional director
or administrative law judge, as the case may be, shall upon receipt of the applica-
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contrary, " neither other administrative agencies," nor the original
Administrative Procedures Act98 provide for prehearing discovery in
the administrative process. However, under the Board rules, witness
affidavits99 become available to a litigant "after a witness called by
the general counsel or by the charging party has testified in a hear-
ing upon a complaint. . . ."100 In other words, the only discovery
available to a party charged with an unfair labor practice under the
National Labor Relations Act, absent the requirements of the Free-
dom of Information Act, is equivalent to that available to a criminal
defendant under the Jencks Act.' 0' Within such a limited discovery
context, it is understandable why labor practitioners viewed the
Freedom of Information Act as a source of broader discovery. The
notion that the FOIA may provide an alternative to rigid discovery
practices before some federal agenices and commissions has not
gone unnoticed. In fact, one government official has remarked that
the FOIA could be "the catalyst for establishing pretrial discovery"
in proceedings before federal administrative agencies.' Such use of
the disclosure act has been criticized:
tion, if in his discretion good cause has been shown, make and serve upon the
parties an order which will specify the name of the witness whose deposition is to
be taken and the time, the place, and the designation of the officer before whom
the witness is to testify ...
96. See Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: Why Agencies Should Catch up
with the Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 74 (1960); Cox, Adherence to the Rules of Evidence and Federal
Rules o Civil Procedure as a Means of Expediting Proceedings, 12 AD. L. BULL. 51, 55 (1959-
60); Gallagher, Use of Pre-Trial as a Means of Overcoming Undue and Unnecessary Delay in
Administrative Proceedings, 12 AD. L. BULL. 44 (1959-60); Kaufman, Have Administrative
Agencies Kept Pace with Modern Court-Developed Techniques against Delay?-A Judge's
View, 12 AD. L. BULL. 103, 115 (1959-60); Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings,
12 AD. L. BULL. 28 (1959).
97. Federal Maritime Commission v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th
Cir. 1964) (Merchant Marine Act does not warrant, much less require, adoption of pre-trial
discovery procedures by the Federal Maritime Commission); Louisville Builders Supply Co.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 294 F.2d 333, 339-42 (6th Cir. 1961)(same result in pre-
trial discovery sought before the Tax Court of the United States).
98. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
99. The NLRB Casehandling Manual (Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings) (1975) pro-
vides that, "[wihenever possible, the charging party's case, if one exists, should be estab-
lished through interviews with the charging party and witnesses offered by the charging
party." Id. at §§ 10056, 10056.2. The statements obtained in these interviews are to be
reduced to affidavits to form the "keystone of the investigation." Id. at §§ 10058.1, 10058.2,
10058.5.
100. 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(b)(1) (1975). The rules provide that the administrative law judge
shall "order the production of any statement .. .of such witness in the possession of the
general counsel which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified ...
[for] examination and use for the purpose of cross-examination." 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(b)(1)
(1975).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
102. Remarks of National Labor Relations Board Chairman Betty Southard Murphy at
Amended FOLA
[Tihe policies behind the FOTA and discovery procedures are
entirely different. The purpose of the FOTA is public disclosure.
• . . [Tihe discovery rules . . . have as their primary goal the
elimination of surprise and unfair trial practices. The two should
not be used interchangeably. 10 3
This distinction, between private citizens seeking agency informa-
tion through the FOIA and unfair labor practice defendants seeking
prehearing discovery by the same means, has fostered a line of case
law that could lead to a return to the mechanical approach used
under the original Act. Yet it is this same line of judicial interpreta-
tions that has grasped the congressional intent of balancing inter-
ests and has applied it realistically to the ever-increasing claims of
FOIA litigants.
Title Guarantee Company v. NLRB
Title Guarantee Company v. NLRB 14 and Cessna Aircraft Com-
pany v. NLRB 05 represent the courts' early attempts to integrate
the FOIA in the context of unfair labor practice proceedings. Cessna
Aircraft Company v. NLRB106 involved a plaintiff employer's at-
tempt to compel production of NLRB-assembled statements of wit-
nesses, investigative notes, witness lists and complaint documents
relating to a Board investigation of an unfair labor practice com-
plaint filed against the plaintiff. Defending on the basis of the (b)(7)
exemption, the Board claimed disclosure would result in an unwar-
ranted invasion of privacy, reveal confidential sources, and interfere
with present and future enforcement proceedings. In deciding the
case, the court concluded that the Board was operating under two
misconceptions. First, whereas the NLRB characterized the suit as
an attempt by Cessna to compel prehearing discovery, the court
viewed the suit simply as an attempt to enforce the company's
rights under the FOIA. Second, the court rejected the Board's asser-
tion that the material was exempt based only on the Board's deter-
a meeting of the American Society of Public Administration in Washington, D.C., October,
1975. Although the Board's traditional position is to prohibit any pretrial discovery, the
chairman perceives a growing trend among private practitioners to use the FOIA disclosure
requirements as a vehicle to obtain pretrial discovery. For a discussion of the potential use
of the FOIA as a discovery device in the field of securities, see Goldberg & Wein, Facilitating
Discovery in Civil Securities Actions: The 1975 Amendments to the Freedom of Information
Act of 1966, 21 N.Y.L.F. 277 (1975). See also Note, Discovery of Government Documents and
the Official Information Privilege, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 142, 152-54 (1976).
103. Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REv. 971,
1150 (1975).
104. 407 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
45 U.S.L.W. 3251 (U.S., Oct. 5, 1976).
105. 405 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Kan. 1975).
106. Id.
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mination"'7 and ordered in camera inspection in keeping with the
mandate of the amended Act. The court reiterated its reliance on
the Act's legislative history in denying the defendant's later motion
for a protective order, in compelling answers to interrogatories relat-
ing to the content of the documents, and in setting a later date for
an in camera inspection.
Before the Cessna court rendered its decision on the merits, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
handed down its decision in Title Guarantee v. NLRB.0 8 On essen-
tially similar facts,'"' the court quoted Cessna:
"[Tihis is not an action to review decisions of the Board regarding
discovery matters which may or may not arise during the hearing
in controversy now before the Board. This is a separate and dis-
tinct action to enforce provisions of the Freedom of Information
Act, whose benefits are available 'to any person'.""'
Regarding the substance of the exemption, the Board relied on
subsections 7(A), 7(C), and 7(D) in arguing that disclosure would
interfere with proceedings, constitute an invasion of personal pri-
vacy and disclose confidential sources. The court analyzed the
wording of the unamended Act and concluded that case law under
it had withheld any material compiled in the course of an investiga-
tion."' The court included Wellman Industries, Inc. v. NLRB"' in
that category, finding the case significant insofar as it held that
affidavits obtained by NLRB investigators were not discoverable
under the unamended Act. The court reasoned that the exemption
was designed to "prevent premature disclosure of an investigation
107. Id. at 1047.
Defendants, in effect, contend that the questioned documents are clearly exempt
under the Act simply because they say it is so ...
"The legislative history clearly indicates that Congress disapproves of those cases,
relied on by the General Counsel . . .which relieve the Government of the obliga-
tion to show that disclosure of a particular investigatory file would contravene the
purposes of Exemption 7."
Id. at 1048, quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 164 (1975).
108. 407 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
109. An unfair labor practice complaint had been filed against the FOIA plaintiff. The
NLRB had concluded its investigation and set the date for its administrative hearing on the
matter when the plaintiff employer filed its request for certain materials relating to the unfair
labor practice action.
110. 407 F. Supp. at 501, quoting Cessna Aircraft Company v. NLRB, 405 F. Supp. 1042,
1046 (D. Kan. 1975).
111. 407 F. Supp. at 504, citing H. REP. 1497, supra note 5, at 11; S. REP. 813, supra note
9, at 9.
112. 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974). For a discussion see text
accompanying note 34 supra.
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so that the Board can present its strongest case." ' 3 Not content to
allow Weliman to act as precedent, the court interpreted the legisla-
tive history and subsequent amendment of the claimed exemption
to require the government to specify some enumerated harm in
order to claim the exemption. Following in camera inspection of the
material, the court concluded that release of the information would
neither block further information of the same type from similar
sources nor stifle effective preparation of the case, despite the gov-
ernment's contention to the contrary. As to the claim of the 7(C)
exemption, the court summarily rejected the defendant's argument
that the right to privacy protected by the exemption included the
right to select the people to whom one would communicate his ideas.
Finally, with regard to defendant's claim that disclosure would re-
veal a confidential source, the court noted that the government had
presented no evidence that the material sought was elicited under
an expressed or implied assurance of confidentiality.
The court's review of the history and language of the amendment
caused it to conclude that:
[Clourts must examine each situation individually and deter-
mine if any of the specific harms enumerated by the statute would
result from disclosure. If the government does not satisfy its statu-
tory burden of proof . . . that some such particular harm exists,
the "general philosophy of full agency disclosure," . must pre-
vail and the material be disclosed."14
Having determined that the NLRB had failed to sustain its burden
of proof as to the enumerated harms, the court denied the Board's
motion to stay an earlier production order.
Such disclosure-oriented ammunition was used effectively in the
pending proceedings in Cessna Aircraft Corporation v. NLRB." 5
Having reviewed the documents in camera, the remaining confron-
113. Id. at 431, quoting Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971).
114. 407 F. Supp. at 504.
115. See also NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corporation, 406 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Tenn.
1976), holding Title Guarantee dispositive on the issue of disclosure of similar witness affida-
vits to another unfair labor practice defendant. The Hardeman Garment court gave the same
reading to the original Act, Welman Industries, and the amended Act's legislative history,
concluding:
"In light of this history, and from the language of the amendment as well, it is
clear that . . . [i]f the government does not satisfy its statutory burden of proof,
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), that some such particular harm exists, the 'general philoso-
phy of full agency disclosure,' NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, at 136,
* * * must prevail and the material be disclosed."
406 F. Supp. at 513. The court concluded that disclosure would not constitute an unwarranted
invasion of privacy nor were such statements taken under an express assurance of confiden-
tiality.
19761
Loyola University Law Journal
tation concerned two witness statements in the Board's possession.
Adopting the reasoning of Title Guarantee, the court found that
disclosure of the two statements would not interefere with enforce-
ment proceedings, would not constitute an unwarranted invasion of
privacy, and would not expose the identity of confidential sources. I,,
On expedited appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district
court in Title Guarantee."7 The court ruled that because of the 7(A)
exemption the employer was not entitled to the written statements
and affidavits, and never reached the invasion of privacy"8 and
confidentiality"9 issues. Not content with what the lower court's in
camera inspection had revealed, the court of appeals concluded that
although all investigative information obtained in connection with
pending enforcement proceedings in itself might be disclosable, dis-
closure of information gathered in connection with unfair labor
practice proceedings could interfere with such proceedings. Such
disclosure could permit suspected violators to learn the Board's case
prematurely and frustrate proceedings or construct defenses which
would permit violations to go unremedied. In addition, employees
might be reluctant to have it known that they supplied information
for fear of incurring employer displeasure or compromising the
union's position in negotiations. The court's opinion was grounded
upon the effect the decision would have on future NLRB proceed-
ings, since "the substantive effect of acceptance of appellee's disclo-
sure contentions would be tantamount to the issuance of new,
broader discovery rules for NLRB proceedings.""'2 This result, in
116. 405 F. Supp. at 1052.
117. Title Guarantee Company v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976). The Act directs that
in the district court and on appellate review, cases arising under the FOIA shall take preced-
ence on the docket over all cases and shall be assigned for hearing or trial or for argument at
the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way. This requirement resulted from a
strong congressional commitment to prompt handling of cases of public access to government
records. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(D) (Supp. I, 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (1970).
118. The privacy issue concerned the disclosure of the names of employees who made
statements about the pending charge. The court relied, in passing, on the lower court's
examination citing Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers v. NLRB, 408 F.
Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1976), and Cessna Aircraft Company v. NLRB, 405 F. Supp. 1042 (D.
Kan. 1975). But see Jamco International, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2446 (N.D. Okla. 1976).
119. Unable to present evidence that the statements were offered in confidence, the Board
argued such confidentiality could be implied from the circumstances. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals noted the lower court's rejection of the argument, citing Deering Milliken,
Inc. v. Nash, 90 L.R.R.M. 3138 (D.S.C. 1975); Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 407 F.
Supp. 208 (D. Colo. 1975).
120. 534 F.2d at 487. The court viewed as significant the delicate relationship between
employer and employee finding Congress reluctant to upset limits and procedures in unfair
labor practice proceedings by way of an act which does not purport to deal with discovery,
although dealing with disclosure generally. Other courts reaching the same conclusion have
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substance, ignored the FOIA aspect of the controversy.
A review of the same exemption, legislative history and case law
that the district court had surveyed prompted the Second Circuit's
opposite conclusion. Curiously, the Second Circuit read the prea-
mendment case of Wellman Industries, Inc. v. NLRB'2 ' as stating
the applicable law. Rather than finding it undermined by the
amended exemption, the court read the legislative debates on the
amendment as seeking to abrogate a line of cases dealing with the
unavailability of closed files.' Since Wellman dealt with an active
NLRB file, the court reasoned that it remained viable and required
nondisclosure in any pending enforcement proceeding.' 23 Having
read the legislative intent behind the amended exemption so nar-
rowly, the court could easily ground its decision in the labor context
of the case:
We cannot envisage that Congress intended to overrule the line of
cases dealing with labor board discovery in pending enforcement
proceedings by virtue of a back-door amendment to the FOIA
when it could very easily have done so by direct amendment to
Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act . . . or by a
blanket enactment pertaining to discovery in pending administra-
tive enforcement proceedings.
In light of the delicate relationship which exists between employer
and employee, we think that Congress would be very reluctant to
based their decisions on the labor context of such FOIA requests. See, e.g., Climax Molyb-
denum Company v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 208, 209 (D. Colo. 1975)(the National Labor Rela-
tions Act and related statutes have established a clearly defined policy that the NLRB is the
primary governmental agency in labor-management law and, as such, is expressly authorized
to establish its own procedures for enforcement); Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v.
NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971, 977 (N.D. Cal. 1976)(finding fault with the lower court's opinion in
Title Guarantee for its failure to appreciate the particular pressures of the "arena" of labor
relations in deciding the case).
121. 490 F.2d 427, 430-31 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974). See text accompa-
nying note 34 supra.
122. 534 F.2d at 490. "The cases that Exemption 7(A) was intended to overrule were for
the most part closed investigative file cases." Id. at 492. To give such a reading to the body
of legislative debates that took place on the floor of both houses necessarily restricts one's
focus to Frankel v. SEC, which is precisely the case cited by the court. Such a limitation not
only unduly restricts the focus of the amendments but clearly abrogates a congressional intent
to dispose of an entire line of cases only beginning with Frankel v. SEC. See text accompany-
ing notes 27 through 55 supra.
123. 534 F.2d at 490 (emphasis added). The court backed away from stating a per se rule
of exemption in all pending NLRB proceedings finding themselves unprepared to hold that
disclosure may be required under the FOIA in connection with any ongoing unfair labor
practice proceeding. Id. at 491. The court ultimately held "statements of employees, and their
representatives, obtained in connection with unfair practice enforcement proceedings are not
subject to disclosure as a result of Exemption 7(A)." Id. at 492.
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change the rather carefully arrived at limitations and procedures
for discovery in unfair labor practice proceedings by way of an act
which, while dealing with disclosure generally, does not purport to
affect such discovery.'24
In its emphasis on the labor relations posture of the case, the Second
Circuit had reduced congressional dissatisfaction with an entire line
of case law to mere discontent with the exemption's application to
closed investigatory files.
Goodfriend Western Corporation v. Fuchs
The disagreement between the district court and court of appeals
in Title Guarantee was mirrored in Goodfriend Western Corp. v.
Fuchs.2 15 The lower court adopted the reasoning of the district court
in Title Guarantee that claims of protection under exemption 7
must be examined individually and that the specific harm imputed
to the agency must be weighed case-by-case." 6 The Goodfriend
Western Corp. court found that disclosure of witness affidavits
would not interfere with an enforcement proceeding scheduled less
than 24 hours later, because the agency had already completed its
investigation and subpoenaed witnesses." 7 The court ordered the
release of only the affidavits of witnesses who had already commit-
ted themselves to air publicly the contents of their affidavits. It
noted that, in any event, such affidavits would be available to the
plaintiff immediately after the direct examination, which would
take place less than 24 hours after the issuance of the court's disclo-
sure order.
The First Circuit reversed, relying upon the newly decided Title
124. 534 F.2d at 491-92.
125. 411 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W.
3306 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1976).
126. 411 F. Supp. at 458. The NLRB relied on exemptions 5, 7(A), 7(C) and 7(D) much
as did the Board in Title Guarantee. Similarly, the court rejected all the alleged exemptions,
concluding disclosure would not interfere with such an imminent enforcement proceeding,
would not expose personal matters since the statements involved only the facts of the labor
dispute, and would not bare confidential sources since such sources were bound to testify in
the upcoming proceeding anyway.
127. The court did, however, note a more compelling case for harm might be made on
different facts. The example cited referred to disclosure of witness affidavits weeks before the
hearing date, which could result in retributive action by an employer or threats preventing
the witness from testifying. The court found that in such a case, the timing of the release of
the affidavits could have a deterrent effect on the availability of testimony whereas in the
instant case, the timing of the release virtually precluded such a possibility. 411 F. Supp. at
485 n.4. As to other NLRB hearings, the court viewed its decision as "dragging no witness
into the limelight," since a future witness could candidly talk with an NLRB investigator with
the full assurance that his statements would remain private until he committed himself, or
resigned himself to testifying in an open hearing, after which testimony his affidavit was
subject to disclosure in any event. Id. at 458.
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Guarantee opinion from the Second Circuit.'28 The court rejected
the district court's emphasis on the "timing" of the disclosure while
the circumstances minimized the possible interference with enforce-
ment proceedings, the court could not rule out the possibility that
the company might be able to use disclosure to learn the Board's
case in advance and frustrate the proceedings.' 9 The court refused
to shoulder a "case-by-case adjudication of [such] discovery dis-
putes in unfair labor practice proceedings," and in so doing, read
Title Guarantee as a per se rule of nondisclosure.'
30
Although explicitly overruled by the Second Circuit and implic-
itly abandoned by the First Circuit, the district court opinion in
Title Guarantee nonetheless remained as precedent for a number of
other courts presented with analogous facts.' 3' Moreover, the dis-
tinction between the district court and court of appeals decisions in
Title Guarantee serves as a useful device for categorizing the multi-
plying FOLA complaints being filed against the National Labor
Relations Board in recent months. 3 1 Whereas the district court
opinion in Title Guarantee approaches the disclosure issue as purely
a matter of statutory interpretation with a secondary glance at the
legislative history and case law underlying the exemption, the court
of appeals decision carries a definite labor relations orientation and
a concern for the ramifications a disclosure decision would-create.
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE FOIA CLAIM IN A LABOR CONTEXT
All courts have agreed that Congress did not intend the FOIA to
be used as a discovery tool.'1 How the courts handle the disclosure
128. 535 F.2d 145, 146 (1st Cir. 1976).
129. Id. at 147.
130. Id.
131. See Baptist Memorial Hospital v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2645, 2647 (W.D. Tenn. 1976);
Bellingham Frozen Foods v. Henderson, 91 L.R.R.M. 2761, 2763 (W.D. Wash. 1976); Gerico,
Inc. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2713, 2716 (D. Colo. 1976) (consolidated); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2072, 2074-75 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
132. "It is interesting . . . to note that in the past 10 months there have been at least 10
opinions/orders of federal courts dealing with the issue presented herein." Chrysler Corp. v.
NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 3191, 3192 (E.D. Mich. 1976); "[Tlhis precise problem, disclosure of
investigative materials compiled by the NLRB for use in pending enforcement proceedings,
has been the subject of a plethora of lawsuits in district courts throughout the country,
resulting in widely divergent decisions." Read's Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2722, 2723 (D.
Md. 1976).
133. See Amerace Corp. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2344, 2345 (W.D. Tenn. 1975)(discovery
for litigation purposes is not an expressly indicated purpose of the FOIA). See generally
Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971, 977 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698, 702 (N.D. Il. 1976); Local 30, United Slate, Tile
& Composition Roofers v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Marathon LeTour-
neau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 1124, 1125-26 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Vegas Village Shopping Corp. v. NLRB,
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issue when such an unintended use of the FOIA is employed has
resulted in two lines of analysis.
One line emphasizes the labor relations implications of informa-
tion requests. Many of the courts that adopt this approach do not
view the plaintiff's claim as one seeking disclosure under the FOIA,
but instead view the action as one seeking prehearing discovery
against the NLRB. 134 Relying on the Board's statutory right to pre-
scribe its own discovery procedures in unfair labor practice proceed-
ings,3 5 these courts note that discovery is prohibited for the most
part, and that disclosure of witness statements occurs only after the
Board has presented its case.' 38 Although these courts are sympa-
thetic to the plaintiff's cries of "trial by ambush"'137 and recognize
the stringent limits of the Board's discovery procedures, 31 they be-
lieve the remedy for any inequities lies with Congress and not the
judiciary:
It is for Congress and not [the] Court, to tell the N.L.R.B. to
reform discovery procedures. The F.O.I.A. does not provide this
92 L.R.R.M. 2683, 2685 (C.D. Cal. 1976). The majority of cases take the proposition from the
Supreme Court's language to that effect in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132,
143 n.10 (1975).
134. Indeed, in some cases the plaintiff seeking disclosure has coupled his FOIA request
with an actual request for discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hook
Drugs, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2797, 2800 (S.D. Ind. 1976)(denial of plaintiff's request to
compel discovery by use of bill of particulars); Rice & Co. v. Nash, 92 L.R.R.M. 3280, 3281
(E.D. Mich. 1976)(sought pretrial discovery to allow taking of employee's deposition); Rob-
bins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2586, 2587 (N.D. Ala. 1976)(request witness
affidavits under the FOIA and the Board's discovery rules and regulations); Sealand Ter-
minal Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2952, 2953 (S.D. Miss. 1976)(coupling FOIA request with
one made under rules 30 and 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking witness
statements and discovery depositions).
135. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 858 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 915 (1971); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 823 (1961). See text accompanying notes 92 and 93 supra.
136. Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698, 703 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Harvey's Wagon
Wheel v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2410, 2412-13 (N.D. Cal. 1976); NLRB v. Biophysics Systems,
Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 3079, 3080 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Vegas Village Shopping Corp. v. NLRB, 92
L.R.R.M. 2683, 2685-86 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
137. However, sympathetic as the Court may be to the claim that refusal of the
NLRB to disclose witness statements results in "trial by ambush," and however
disdainful the Court might be of the NLRB's policy of restricting discovery to the
bare legal minimum, the wisdom of the NLRB's discovery rules are not before this
Court.
Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971, 977 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See
also Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 3527, 3531 (D. Kan. 1976).
138. "We join in plaintiff's condemnation of N.L.R.B. discovery practices. We are, in-
deed, shocked that such discovery is so stringently limited." Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v.
NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 3527, 3531 (D. Kan. 1976). See also Bellingham Frozen Foods v. Hender-
son, 91 L.R.R.M. 2761, 2762 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
Amended FOIA
Court with a vehicle for reforming archaic N.L.R.B. proceedings,
despite the Court's contrary desire. 39
The primary rationale underlying a labor characterization of a
FOIA action rests in the nature of labor proceedings themselves. As
the Second Circuit recognized in Title Guarantee, there exists a
delicate relationship between employer and employee in unfair
labor practice proceedings. 140 An appreciation of this relationship
helps explain the NLRB's reluctance to release information that
might tend to strain the relationship and unduly hamper the
Board's efforts to enforce federal labor legislation. Accordingly, in
deference to the peculiar character of labor litigation, the courts
restrict discovery of government witnesses and their statements.
The witnesses are likely to be inhibited by fear of the employer's or
the union's capacity for reprisal and harassment.' In fact, it was
this possibility of employer coercion that prompted the Supreme
Court to extend the protection of the National Labor Relations Act
to employees giving statements during NLRB investigations.' This
fear of inhibiting witness cooperation has substantially occupied the
courts that stress the labor context of the plaintiff's FOIA claim.
When a plaintiff advocates disclosure of "investigatory records" in
possession of the Board, a number of courts have relied on exemp-
tion 7(A) to deny a release that could interfere with enforcement
proceedings. These courts are convinced that to hold otherwise
would have a tendency to "chill" employees who sought to exercise
their right to press unfair labor practice charges.4 3
Recognizing this possibility, the court in Local 30, United Slate,
Tile and Composition Roofers v. NLRB"41 remarked that its in
camera inspection of affidavits in the Board's investigatory file re-
vealed personal assaults, threats of bodily harm, prevention of per-
sons from entering work sites, expulsion of persons from work sites,
and destruction of materials, property and equipment. Statements
139. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 3527, 3531 (D. Kan. 1976). See also
Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976)(had Congress intended to amend
Board discovery procedures it could have done so directly); Harvey's Wagon Wheel v. NLRB,
91 L.R.R.M. 2410, 2414 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (declining to alter discovery balance between NLRB
and defendant, absent a much clearer indication from Congress to that effect).
140. 534 F.2d at 492.
141. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976).
142. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
143. NLRB v. Biophysics Systems, Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 3079, 3081 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Contra,
Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 427, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Local 32,
United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry
v. Irving, 91 L.R.R.M. 2513, 2515 (W.D. Wash. 1976)(consolidated).
144. 408 F. Supp. 520, 526 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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regarding these incidents led the court to conclude that the divulg-
ence of affidavits containing such information in advance of the
hearing would create substantial danger that witnesses might be
intimidated or might become reluctant to testify.4 5 The courts that
dwell on the unique labor posture of these cases verge upon a per se
rule of nondisclosure so as to avoid coercion in the labor proceedings
themselves. The holding of the court in Climax Molybdenum Com-
pany v. NLRB 4 ' is illustrative:
The labor case is peculiarly susceptible to employer retaliation,
coercion, or influence to the point that it can be concluded that
there is no need for an express showing of interference in each case
to justify giving effect to the exemption contained in Section 7(A)
in Labor Board proceedings.
In sum, it follows that the proceedings herein were enforcement
in nature and were continuing, and the [7(A)] exemption applies
to the present efforts of the company to gain possession of the
requested documents."7
This language is reminiscent of earlier case law denounced by the
Congress for mechanical resolution of the exemption issue. More-
over, the focus on labor relations consequences in such cases has
blurred the court's view of the Freedom of Information Act as a
whole.
DEALING WITH THE INFORMATION REQUEST IN ITS FOIA CONTEXT
A second line of analysis' has come from courts that also recog-
nize that the FOIA was not intended as a discovery device but
145. Id. at 526. See also Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976); Climax
Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 3467, 3468 (10th Cir. 1976); Goodfriend Western
Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 1976); Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v.
NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971, 976 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698,
704 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
146. 92 L.R.R.M. 3467 (10th Cir. 1976).
147. Id. at 3468 (emphasis added). See also Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. NLRB, 407
F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1976), relying on the lower court decision in Climax Molybdenum
to reach a similar conclusion that the Board need show nothing more than that proceedings
are pending in order to render the contents of an investigatory filed exempt under 7(A). Other
courts reaching essentially the same conclusion state their holdings in general terms rather
than limiting them to the particular fact situations before them. As such, they represent
precedent for applying the 7(A) exemption across the board in labor proceedings. E.g., Au &
Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976); Harvey's Wagon Wheel v. NLRB, 91
L.R.R.M. 2410, 2415 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Pacific Photo Type, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2560
(D. Hawaii 1976)(consolidated).
148. The author does not mean to imply that the body of case law under the amended
Act can be easily divided between divergent rationales, rather these rationales merely serve
to organize the myriad of treatments given the FOIA issues by the court. In this respect a
court's reasoning may fall into a number of categories as set up by the author, all leading to
a court's particular resolution of the case before it.
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conclude that a party's litigation status with an agency does not
affect his right of access to information available under the FOIA. 149
Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to exclude consideration of
a plaintiff's reasons for seeking disclosure when dealing with the
exemption question.5 0
These courts resolve the disclosure issue by a review of case law
under the original Act and the effect of the subsequent amendment
upon the precedential value of that case law. Many of these courts
consider Wellman Industries, Inc. v. NLRB 5' the appropriate ana-
lytical starting point. Confronted with a similar request for NLRB
witness affidavits, these courts concluded that Welman was still
good law despite its preamendment status. Wellman was decided
when the exemption contained the proviso "except to the extent
available by law to a party other than an agency." But NLRB rules
had never allowed disclosure of witness affidavits and investigative
reports,' so the absence of the proviso could not inure to the benefit
of plaintiffs seeking disclosure under the amended Act. In so doing,
courts read the congressional intent behind the amendment as lim-
ited to reversing "closed file" cases,' or a specific line of "District
of Columbia Circuit Court cases."' 54 Accordingly, since Welman
was "[n]otably absent from the list of cases Senator Hart intended
to overrule by his amendment,"'' s it remained precedent for nondis-
closure.151
149. See Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698, 702 (N.D. I1. 1976); Jamco Interna-
tional, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2446, 2448 (N.D. Okla. 1976); Local 30, United Slate, Tile
& Composition Roofers v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Vegas Village
Shopping Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2683, 2685 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
150. See Amerace Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 3497, 3498 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), citing
Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974), and E'PA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73 (1973) for the proposition that a plaintiff's motivation is irrelevant under the Freedom
of Information Act.
151. 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974). See text accompanying note
34 supra.
152. Although the Wellman court did not cite the NLRB's administrative regulation
barring such disclosure, the court did find the House Report significant in that the Act was
not intended to give a party indirectly any earlier or greater access to investigatory files than
he would have directly in such litigation or proceedings. H. REP. 1497, supra note 5, at 11.
153. See Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3251 (U.S., Oct. 5, 1976); Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698, 704 (N.D.
11. 1976); Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520,
524 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
154. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 1976); Climax Molybdenum Co.
v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 3466, 3467 (10th Cir. 1976); Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v.
NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971, 975 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Harvey's Wagon Wheel v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M.
2410, 2413 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Jamco International, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2446, 2448
(N.D. Okla. 1976); Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp.
520, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Maremont Corp. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2804, 2809 (W.D. Okla.
1976); Vegas Village Shopping Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2683, 2686 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
155. Harvey's Wagon Wheel v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2410, 2413 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
156. Finding that Welman had not been undercut by the 1974 amendments, many courts
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Because the legislative history stated that the amended Act was
not meant to be a radical departure from existing case law,'57 this
interpretation appears to do justice to the congressional intent.
However, such a reading of the amended Act fails to take into ac-
count the depth of congressional concern with the expansive inter-
pretations given the exemption by certain courts. Rather than
sanctioning a per se rule of exemption that could be invoked by
demonstrating the existence of investigatory files used in an enforce-
ment proceeding, Congress intended that the agency bear the bur-
den of demonstrating that disclosure violates one of the protected
interests of the exemption. By shifting the burden of proof to the
agency and authorizing in camera review, Congress sought to do
more than undermine such cases as Ditlow, Weisberg, Aspin and
Center for National Policy. Congress demanded that the agency
show conclusively that release of the information would produce a
harm falling explicitly within an exemption. If the agency could
offer nothing more than generalized assertions of enforcement inter-
ference, then the policy of disclosure should govern. By delimiting
the legislative concern behind the amendment to a disapprobation
of closed file cases, courts have similarly undermined the burden of
proof and in camera inspection mandates. There is a trend to repu-
diate altogether the need for in camera inspection of disputed mate-
rials when the statements sought are part of a case file in a pending
enforcement proceeding.'58
Yet if courts do not inspect the documents in question, they must
rely upon an agency's unsupported characterization of the contested
papers. Unwilling to avail themselves of an impartial means of as-
found it dispositive of the exemption issue. See, e.g., Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 92
L.R.R.M. 3466, 3468 (10th Cir. 1976); Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F.
Supp. 971, 975 (N.D. Cal, 1976); Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698, 704 (N.D. Ill.
1976); Harvey's Wagon Wheel v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2410, 2413-14 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Jamco
International, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2446, 2449 (N.D. Okla. 1976); Read's Inc. v. NLRB,
91 L.R.R.M. 2722, 2723 (D. Md. 1976); Vegas Village Shopping Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M.
2683, 2687 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
157. 120 CONG. REC. 9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Hart). See also
Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976); Capital Cities Communications, Inc.
v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971, 975 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition
Roofers v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520, 525-26 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Vegas Village Shopping Center
Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2683, 2686 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
158. The Third Circuit in Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976), points
up the growing trend among courts concluding, "[slince there is no question that the state-
ments sought are part of a case file in a pending enforcement proceeding, there is no need
for an in camera inspection of the disputed materials."
Id. at 3195 n.ll. See also Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 3466, 3468 (10th
Cir. 1976); Harvey's Wagon Wheel v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2410, 2415 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Pacific
Photo Type, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2560 (D. Hawaii 1976) (consolidated); Robbins Tire
& Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2586, 2588 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
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sessment and reluctant to engage in the case-by-case determina-
tions inherent in de novo review, these courts have embraced blan-
ket nondisclosure in all labor proceeding cases.'59 Some have shifted
the burden of proof from the defending agency to the plaintiff, in-
controvertibly in derogation of the FOIA's language.9 0 Others have
abdicated their statutory duty to justify reliance upon exemption
7(A) by an express showing of interference in each case.' 6 ' In these
ways, many courts have distorted the FOIA's language and purpose.
The recent case law involving the seventh exemption reflects judi-
cial inability to integrate the schemes set forth in the Freedom of
Information Act and the National Labor Relations Act. Distress-
ingly, the courts that have considered the FOIA aspects of disclosure
of NLRB investigative reports have done the most violence to the
spirit and letter of the Act itself. By reversing the burden of proof,
denying the need for specific showing of harm, rejecting in camera
review, and restricting the congressional intent behind the amended
exemption, courts have nurtured precedents that threaten to nullify
the Act's balanced disclosure policy regarding investigatory records.
However, a few courts have made genuine efforts to reconcile these
two ostensibly conflicting approaches.
JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO FIT THE FOIA REQUEST INTO THE LABOR
CONTEXT
The FOIA mandates a general policy of full disclosure; the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act requires a sensitivity to the unique rela-
tionship of management and labor. Thus, the disclosure require-
ments of FOIA must be tempered with an awareness of the impor-
tant sequence of events dictated by the National Labor Relations
Act. ' 2 The courts that have attempted to harmonize the objectives
159. [A] consequence of the company's position would be that the courts would
be called on to determine on a case by case basis whether a particular file would
interfere with NLRB enforcement proceedings. This court is ill-fitted to make such
determinations. It is impossible to believe that Congress intended to call upon the
federal courts to perform this task.
Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 3466, 3468 (10th Cir. 1976). See also Good-
friend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3306
(U.S., Oct. 19, 1976); Gimbel Bros. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2733, 2734 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Local
30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
160. Hook Drugs, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2797, 2801 (S.D. Ind. 1976).
161. Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 3466, 3468 (10th Cir. 1976).
162. The language of the court in Gerico, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2713 (D. Colo. 1976)
(consolidated), is illustrative:
While the FOIA mandates a general policy and blue print of full disclosure, the
NLRA requires a sensitivity to the unique relationship of management and labor.
Thus, the disclosure requirements of FOIA must be tempered with an awareness
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of the NLRA with the FOIA have tried to assess the potential for
coercion surrounding an unfair labor practice charge. Fully aware
of how coercion can interfere with the Board's enforcement function,
the courts allow disclosure whenever such interference can be mini-
mized or done away with totally. An important consideration influ-
encing the courts is the NLRB rule providing for disclosure of wit-
ness affidavits after direct examination in the administrative pro-
ceeding.' This "eventual disclosure" has motivated some courts to
frame the question in terms of setting a proper timetable for disclo-
sure. "'4 They have reasoned that after the NLRB has completed an
investigation, committed witnesses to testify, and scheduled the
proceedings for the near future, release of witness affidavits at this
juncture could in no way interfere with enforcement proceedings.'65
Such judicially constructed timetables have ranged from a 24-hour
period' to 1 month"6 7 depending upon the likelihood that interfer-
ence would result from a premature disclosure.
In constructing these disclosure timetables, courts have fashioned
the disclosure remedy to ensure that the harms sought to be avoided
by the exemptions do not occur. These qualifications have taken
various forms. A distinction has usually been drawn between the
affidavits of witnesses who will not testify at the enforcement pro-
ceeding and the statements of those who will, only the latter being
subject to disclosure under a timetable. 8 One court limited the
NLRB to calling to testify just those witnesses whose affidavits had
been previously released to the FOIA plaintiff.'69 To prevent intimi-
of the important sequence of events dictated by the NLRA. For that reason, the
objectives of the NLRA must be harmonized-if possible-with FOIA.
We believe the requirements of FOIA can be satisfied without doing violence to
the important requirements of the National Labor Relations Act.
Id. at 2716. The court resolved the two acts by postponing temporarily, rather than exempt-
ing, disclosure of the documents at issue. Id.
163. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
164. See, e.g., Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 411 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mass.), rev'd,
535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S., Oct. 19, 1976); Barnes & Noble
Bookstores v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2169 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
165. Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 411 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 535 F.2d 145
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S., Oct. 19, 1976); Maremont Corp. v. NLRB,
91 L.R.R.M. 2804, 2810 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 92
L.R.R.M. 2586, 2589 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
166. Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 411 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 535 F.2d 145
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S., Oct. 19, 1976).
167. Maremont Corp. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2805, 2810 (W.D. Okla. 1976). See also
Gerico, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2713, 2716-17 (D. Colo. 1976) (unstated period of time
between FOIA claim and proceedings); Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M.
2586, 2588 (N.D. Ala. 1976) (period of a few days).
168. Amerace Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 3497, 3499 (W.D. Tenn. 1976); Robbins Tire
& Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2586, 2588 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
169. Local 32 v. Irving, 91 L.R.R.M. 2513, 2515 (W.D. Wash. 1976)(consolidated).
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dation of witnesses during the period between disclosure and the
unfair labor practice hearing, some courts have prohibited the FOIA
plaintiff from contacting the witnesses whose affidavits were or-
dered disclosed.'7 ° In an attempt to release the substance of con-
tested affidavits but preserve the anonymity of the affiant em-
ployee, the court in Furr's Cafeterias Inc. v. NLRB 7' ordered the
release of all witness affidavits following the deletion of names and
identifying references. Such innovative remedies go far towards ac-
commodating the preoccupation with witness coercion in the labor
context and the disclosure policy of the FOIA.
A dividend of such case law is a more equitable discovery balance
between unfair labor practice defendants and the NLRB. These
courts recognize that disclosure should benefit rather than harm the
Board's case,'72 enabling the defense to understand the charges
against its client,' prepare its case,' plan its cross-examination,
develop the administrative record, 75 or otherwise defend against the
charges. The court's reasoning in Maremont Corp. v. NLRB'75 serves
as an example:
It is true that F.O.I.A. disclosure may inconvenience [the NLRB].
However, inconvenience is not synonymous with Exemption (7)
"interference." [The Board's] prosecutive task may become
somewhat more exacting; its witnesses will have to be more scru-
pulous in their attention to the truth; they will have to be better
able to withstand knowledgeable cross-examination. But such dif-
ficulties are not what the amended exemption contemplated ...
The ruling of this Court will not prevent [the Board] from
presenting its strongest case in the administrative hearing. Rather,
170. [Slhould the affidavits . . . reveal the affiants . . . [the plaintiff] is
hereby prohibited from approaching, contacting, calling or otherwise seeking out
and confronting the affiants prior to the presentation of each affiant's testimony at
the National Labor Relations Board hearing in question.
Furr's Cafeterias, Inc. v. NLRB, 416 F. Supp. 629, 631 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
171. 416 F. Supp. 629 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
172. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2072, 2075 (C.D. Cal. 1976),
quoting Deering-Milliken, Inc. v. Nash, 90 L.R.R.M. 3138 (D.D.C. 1975):
Contrary to defendant's assertions, the Court finds compelling plaintiff's argument
that F.O.I.A. disclosure of witness statements might actually aid defendant's ef-
forts to effectuate the purposes of the N.L.R.A. Voluntary settlement of claims the
Board finds to be meritorious and warranting a complaint is a significant enforce-
ment goal. To the extent that F.O.I.A. disclosure would inform Board respondents
of the strengths of the case against them, the Board's pre-hearing settlement record
may be increased.
Maremont Corp. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2804, 2810 n.12 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
173. Barnes & Noble Bookstores v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2169, 2170 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
174. Baptist Memorial Hospital v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2645, 2647 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
175. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2072, 2073 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
176. 91 L.R.R.M. 2804 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
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[it] will be compelled to do so. [The NLRB] should not be able
to prevail simply by virtue of a cross-examination or defense weak-
ened by lack of fore-knowledge. If [the Board] is to succeed in its
administrative hearings, it should be because of the strengths of
its own case, not the Board-fostered weaknesses of its oppo-
nent's. 7
The constantly reiterated justification for protecting NLRB affi-
davits from disclosure is fear of reprisal by the company or the union
against the employee. Therefore, in instances where disclosure will
not precipitate reprisal, the court should order release of the con-
tested material. Temple-Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB 7 1 illustrates the pro-
per approach. Plaintiff sought an injunctive order requiring disclo-
sure of certain statements and affidavits obtained in the course of
an NLRB investigation of an unfair labor practice charge. When
plaintiff requested information pursuant to the FOIA, the NLRB
denied the request on the basis that the statements were exempt
under sections 7(A), 7(C) and 7(D). The court agreed with the
NLRB that the records were "investigatory" and were compiled for
law enforcement purposes. However, the court reasoned that certain
affidavits, favorable to Temple-Eastex in its defense at the unfair
labor practice hearing, would never come to light for inspection at
the hearing because the Board prosecutor would not call a witness
who had made statements favorable to the company. Because the
company would not desire to punish affiants who had made state-
ments supporting its position "' and because the affidavits did not
involve union members, the court discerned no justification for in-
voking the exemption and thus ordered immediate disclosure.'80
The Temple-Eastex court adopted the FOIA's emphasis on the
fullest responsible disclosure without jeopardizing the interests of
the parties in the labor dispute. By reviewing contested documents
in camera on a case-by-case basis, some courts have avoided the
imposition of a per se rule of disclosure or exemption. To integrate
the FOIA's disclosure mandate into the labor context, a few courts
have created timetables that allow for maximum disclosure with
177. Id. at 2810.
178. 410 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
179. Id. at 186.
180. See also Gerico, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2713 (D. Colo. 1976), where the court's
in camera inspection revealed similar pro-company witness statements. Rather than order
immediate disclosure, the court postponed release until termination of the unfair labor prac-
tice proceedings. The court noted that there was opportunity for review of the Board's deci-
sion prior to the entry of an enforcement order and that the Board's finding had to be
supported by "substantial evidence" in any case..Id. at 2717.
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minimum enforcement proceeding 'rnterference. In so doing, the
courts have judicially resolved a conflict that Congress did not an-
ticipate when it drafted and amended the Freedom of Information
Act-the use of the FOIA as a discovery device against federal ad-
ministrative agencies.
CONCLUSION
Congress and the courts may once again be squaring off for a
battle over the proper interpretation of the Freedom of Information
Act. Congress, for all its laudable intentions, did not foresee certain
ingenious uses of the amended Act. The FOIA was designed to ex-
pose the internal workings of administrative agencies, but legal
practitioners have used it to advance their clients' cases. With an
eye to the stated congressional intent, the courts have scrutinized
the claims of those who view the Act as a discovery tool. In the
absence of congressional guidance, the burden of resolving the ques-
tion of disclosure for litigation purposes has fallen upon the courts.
Because of the Act's provisions for expedited trial and appeal, litiga-
tion has burgeoned and the attendant problems have rapidly devel-
oped to a critical stage.
The courts may be able to shoulder the burden by staying within
the framework of the amended Act. Though Congress did not explic-
itly consider the novel uses of the FOIA when it amended the Act,
exemption 7 appears to contain language sufficient to protect
governmental enforcement efforts. Thus, it is possible that the bal-
ancing of interests embodied in the amended investigatory records
exemption can fully accommodate the attempts of administrative
litigants to use the FOIA for litigation purposes.
The recent claims of litigants in unfair labor practice cases have
caused some courts to seek mechanical bases of decision, a treat-
ment expressly repudiated by Congress when it amended the origi-
nal Act. While courts should consider the administrative context of
these claims, a single consideration should not provide the exclusive
basis of decision. Deference to the labor posture of a case without
reflection upon its FOIA implications may result in an evasion of
congressional intent. Moreover, many courts have not restricted the
precedential value of their holdings to the labor context. 8 ' Applied
181. The court in Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976), specifically
limited its holding to the labor context in which the case arose. "[W]e do not intend our
comments to apply broadly to administrative contexts other than unfair labor practice en-
forcement proceedings before the NLRB." Id. at 492. Other courts have not circumscribed
the precedential value of their holdings. See Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80, 83 (3d
Cir. 1976); Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 3467, 3468 (10th Cir. 1976);
1976]
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to other administrative circumstances that lack the unique charac-
teristics of the labor relationship, the decisions of these courts stand
as a broad rule of nondisclosure in any ongoing enforcement pro-
ceeding. This recurrence of mechanical interpretations of the origi-
nal Act threatens the disclosure policy behind the congressional
amendment.
TIMOTHY J. McGONEGLE
Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W.
3306 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1976); Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971,
976 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698, 704 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
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APPENDIX
Special Analysis of Operations of the Freedom of Information Act,
Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress.
Taken from the Congressional Record, March 23, 1972
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